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Mobile Diasporas, Postcolonial Identities: The Green Line in Cyprus 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the scope for understanding postcolonial and hybrid 
identities through the theory of ontological security in International 
Relations.  It examines the circulation of identity for a dispersed 
postcolonial population, namely Cypriots.  This circulation happens 
amongst a deterritorialised public, through media and movement of 
people. It carries meaning that is formative of the identity of the diaspora 
and of the identity of the home state, implicating both in a complex and 
relational ontological security comprising identity, memory, state and 
society. The Green Line dividing North from South in Cyprus represents 
the bifurcation of the island, rupturing the possibility of a territorially 
unified Cypriot identity. The line also represents a rupturing of 
contiguous ethnic identities, marking the creation of refugee populations 
and Cypriot diasporas.  The Green Line is both a physical location and 
circulating symbol of ontological insecurity.  On one hand the Green Line 
marks the creation of Cypriot refugees and diasporas. On the other it 
marks a gateway to Europe for asylum seekers attempting to enter the 
Southern part of the island.  I theorise the Green Line as an emblem of 
ontological insecurity whose meaning is (re)constituted in the lived 
experience of Cypriot diaspora and migrants seeking security, revealing a 
hybrid and fluid identity. 
 
 
One hot day in July in the early 1990s my sister and I were in a small taverna that my 
grandparents ran, below the Apollo Hotel in Paphos on the dusty road that ran to the sea 
shore, the old lighthouse and the ancient Odeon.  My grandparents were at a funeral so my 
parents had taken over the running of the taverna for the day.  My sister was waiting on 
tables; I was adding up the bills and helping myself to ice cream.  During a quiet moment in 
the late morning we stumbled upon a set of beer mats that bore the image of the outline of 
Cyprus with blood dripping from the top, and the message ‘δεν ξεχνώ’. We had seen this 
picture before and we knew what the words said – “I don’t forget”.1  The image represented 
the Turkish ‘occupation’ of the Northern part of the island.  The blood dripping represented 
the blood of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots who had died in the fighting and who had lost 
homes, family members and friends.  We knew that you couldn’t cross the dividing line in the 
island if you were Cypriot but that sometimes tourists could cross over.  We decided to give 
out these drink mats with the drinks in the taverna and explain to the tourists who came into 
the taverna why they shouldn’t visit the northern occupied territory. 
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My childhood was saturated with images of the Cyprus conflict.  I spent every 
summer in Paphos with my grandparents.  My grandfather is from a village to the north east 
of Paphos named Anavargos although in recent years it has been consumed by the growing 
city.  I remember my grandfather showing me what had formerly been the house of his 
childhood friend, a Turkish Cypriot, telling tales of the fun they used to have.  My parents 
took my sister and me to Lefkosia when I was about eight or nine years old.  I remember 
being appalled by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus flag (the inverse colours of the 
Turkish flag) imposed on the hillside overlooking the city as a constant reminder of the 
division – a view that became normal to me later when I lived in Lefkosia as a student.  On a 
different occasion we took a trip to Polis via a road that passed through an abandoned Turkish 
Cypriot village. ‘Smelly village, they call it’ my grandmother chuckled ‘because farmers 
keep their animals in the houses’.  In 1996 we were visiting my mother’s godmother, 
watching the news as Greek Cypriot Solomos Solomou was shot from a flagpole.  Two of her 
children were at the demonstrations and the violence gave cause for concern.  
 The division of Cyprus into two parts was physically completed in 1974 following a 
Greek nationalist coup that ousted the president, Archbishop Makarios, and the subsequent 
invasion / intervention by Turkey.  The processes that led to the division began earlier – some 
would argue in 1964 when Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves designed both to 
protect them from Greek nationalism and to imprison, or in 1964 when British Major General 
Peter Young first conceived of the ceasefire zone and drew a line – supposedly with a green 
crayon – across a map of Cyprus, dividing the country in two.  Some would argue the process 
began in 1963 when Archbishop Makarios proposed thirteen amendments to the Constitution 
that would remove the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot minority, or in 1960 when the 
independent country adopted an unworkable constitution that fixed ethnic identity into 
separate interest groups.  Some would argue the process began in the struggle for 
independence that pitted Greek EOKA and aims for enosis (unity with Greece) against 
Turkish Cypriot interests and taksim (partition), or when the British colonial administration 
created Turkish Cypriot police forces to combat growing EOKA militarization and fostered 
discord between the two groups.  Some would argue the process began in 1571 when Cyprus 
was annexed to the Ottoman Empire.  Others would argue that Cyprus, because of its 
geographic location, will always be at the centre of a territorial struggle and thus division is 
to be expected.   
The history of the division is complex and multifaceted and the effect of the division 
even more so.  The UN buffer zone known as the Green Line that divides Cyprus has become 
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a symbol of the intractable conflict on the island.  It is a symbol of the inability of people to 
return to their homes.  It is the symbol of missing people, wartime atrocities, mass graves, 
death and loss.  Images of the line circulate – barbed wire, dripping blood – in everyday life 
in Cyprus and amongst Cypriots outside of the island. 
In this paper I consider the circulation of the symbol of the Green Line.  The Green 
Line is a border, but is not a conventional border. Work in critical border studies recognises 
that borders are performative and processual, their meanings shift and change.2 As in-group 
and out-group identities are performed, so borders are made and remade. Here, rather than 
examining the bordering processes of the Green Line, I posit that the Green Line is a symbol 
of ontological insecurity that circulates and by drawing attention to that symbol of 
ontological insecurity, it becomes apparent that the theory of ontological security in 
international relations can offer some insight into hybrid and fluid identities that characterize 
postcolonial, transnational, diasporic and migrant experience. I draw attention to how the 
Green Line, in many different guises, constitutes Cypriot identity in different contexts and in 
different encounters. The subjects of the symbol of the Green Line are various, thus giving 
the line multiple meanings that merge together around this complex circulating signifier.  
Circulation happens amongst a deterritorialised public outside and inside of Cyprus through 
media and movement and represents the hybrid and multiple identities attached to Cyprus and 
encountering the line – Greek, Turkish, Cypriot, Commonwealth, European, postcolonial.  
The symbol of the line carries meaning that is formative and productive of the identity of 
Cypriots, implicating a complex and relational ontological security comprising identity, 
memory, state and society. The Green Line is both a physical location and circulating symbol 
of ontological insecurity.  On one hand the Green Line marks the creation of Cypriot refugees 
and diasporas. On the other it marks a gateway to Europe for asylum seekers attempting to 
enter the Southern part of the island.  A third dimension presents the Green Line as a tourist 
destination, a site of contemporary history to be consumed alongside the Ancient and 
Byzantine relics that testify to the Greek cultural heritage of the island, discounting and 
silencing the years of Ottoman Cyprus.  I theorise the Green Line as an emblem of 
ontological (in)security whose meaning is (re)constituted in the lived experience of Cypriots 
inside and outside of Cyprus, of migrants seeking security within European borders, and of 
tourists seeking to consume history and culture. 
 
 In what follows I offer a brief discussion of memory, trauma and ontological security 
in international relations, grounding this study in a critique of the tacit assumption of linear 
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identity in ontological security theory in international relations in which the state is the 
primary subject of security.3  I then turn to the Green Line in Cyprus as a circulating symbol 
of ontological (in)security.  Rebecca Bryant argues that the opening of the border in 2003 
made the border more real for Greek Cypriots in Cyprus.4  Prior to that, Greek Cypriots 
imagined an empty and deprived zone, an ‘open air prison’ where life remained stagnant 
waiting for the return of their communities.5  When the border opened, the physical act of 
crossing it, of showing a passport in order to go to homes people still considered their own, 
made the border more real – the border was not a zone of oppression or imprisonment that 
was outside of regular politics. The border was recreated as a functional space and gained a 
sense of legitimacy.  Thus, in 2003 the line became a de facto border at which one would 
perform the normal rituals of immigration.  The view of Turkish Cypriot life, of towns and 
villages and populations who continued to exist forced a reshaping of the vision that many 
Greek Cypriots had maintained for three decades.6  This re-shaping can be understood as a 
moment of change – the opening and regularization of travel across the border reconstituted 
the border as a permanent functional part of the island rather than an aberration or scar on the 
landscape.   
With this in mind, I consider the line in different guises: the first as a symbol of the 
violence that divided the island, with particular attention to how the line is discussed in a 
documentary named Our Wall (1993), which was made collaboratively by a Greek Cypriot 
and a Turkish Cypriot to mark the 20th anniversary of the division, and reflects on the 
meaning of the wall for Cypriot identities. I examine how the line circulates as a symbol of 
violence and in doing so reproduces Cypriot identities that are afflicted by violence. The 
trauma that results serves, in turn, to reproduce the Green Line. I then look to the line in 
contemporary international guises – I consider first the line as it is constituted as a border of 
Europe differentiating the Republic of Cyprus from the territory of the TRNC, analysing the 
annual reports from the European Commission on the Green Line Regulation from 2006-
2011 (most recent).  These reports monitor the passing of people and goods across the line as 
a de facto border of Europe, while refraining from establishing it with that official 
designation. Here, I argue that the line constitutes Cypriot identity as simultaneously 
European and Other. It also replicates the division of the island, making the Republic of 
Cyprus part of desirable and developed Europe, and the North, conversely, part of the global 
south, a transit zone through which move refugees.  I then turn to a more benign but no less 
significant rendering of the wall as a tourist destination, considering its coverage and reviews 
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on tourist websites Trip Adviser, Rough Guide and Virtual Tourist. Here the symbol of the 
line serves to mark Cypriot identity as simultaneously European (where tourists can 
experience a conflict zone from the comfort of a European holiday resort) and Other as the 
line remains the marker of difference, of the exotic and the dangerous. I argue that these 
renderings of the line both reflect and produce a fluid and intersectional Cypriot identity that 
can usefully complicate ontological security theory in international relations. 
 
Memory, trauma and identity: the production of the Green Line 
Memory has long been established as part of the practice of national identity. 
Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ foregrounded the role of memory and the 
reproduction of shared historical myths and memories in national identity.  Maurice 
Halbwachs conceptualised the collective nature of memory and Jenny Edkins’ seminal work 
on memory and trauma in international politics elaborated the specifics of how particular 
traumas are mourned and memorialised in the national and collective imaginary.7  Edkins 
draws a distinction between the act of remembering (such as in testimony and memoir) and 
the process and aesthetics of memorialisation that one might find in monuments and 
museums.  Yet, in both of these cases ‘the production of memory is a performative practice, 
and inevitably social’.8  The social practice of remembering is not only about memory but 
also about forgetting.  As a dominant narrative of memory is accepted as the master narrative 
or hegemonic narrative of events, other events and ways of remembering might be 
overlooked or willingly and actively forgotten.  For example, experiences of war are often 
retold and established as heroism and national glory, effectively ‘forgetting’ the unpleasant 
aspects of warfare, or potentially establishing right on the side of the victors, overlooking 
fault and blame.9   
As Brent Steele discusses, a biographical narrative of collective memory that 
reproduces state identity establishes an ontological security for a state collective that is 
intimately tied to how that state sees itself.10  The biographical narrative produces and 
reproduces the collective identity of the state, creating a social construction that performs a 
particular identity when interacting with and relating to its peers, that is, other states.  A 
biographical identity (and corresponding ontological security) is produced both internally to 
the state and externally in the social relations of the state and the surrounding context in 
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which the state exists.11  Trauma, in disrupting the linear time upon which a state’s 
biographical narrative is based, destabilises the ontological security of the state that relies on 
that narrative and creates an ‘opening’ for a re-writing of the narrative.12  The re-writing is 
necessary in order to process the trauma – whether exogenously generated or linked to 
‘shameful’ acts that do not correspond to the biographical identity narrative – and to re-
establish ontological security.  Traumatic experiences not only create an opening but also 
resonate because of the deep emotional effect of trauma on individuals, on witnesses, and on 
the collective experience.  But memory is imperfect: as a social process of remembering and 
forgetting, and as a process that involves people who might form a collective but have vastly 
different frames of reference, the narrative becomes a space of political contestation.13  Power 
is part of the production of a narrative but also saturates the acceptance of the narrative by the 
audience or society for whom it is produced.14 
Because the narrative of identity must be fixed and stable for ontological security to 
be produced and reproduced for the nation, by necessity state identity must be fixed for a 
national collective to have ontological security. Even when the identity narrative changes, 
change happens to re-establish and even reinforce a fixed, static identity – a state’s idea of 
itself.  The focus on narrative identity in many ways presumes a linear narrative and a 
national collective that shares intersubjective collective memories that are constitutive of 
identity.  Indeed, markers and monuments serve to reconstitute a national imaginary and hold 
particular events as sacred in the memory of the nation, such as the London Cenotaph and the 
Vietnam Wall.15  Memory of trauma as constitutive of the national imaginary suggests that 
national collectives – or the nation state as agent – can experience human emotion as a single 
entity.   
Transnational identity such as that of diaspora communities disrupts the simple linear 
narrative of state identity.  A diasporic collective memory establishes and reproduces the ties 
of the diaspora to the homeland and to the hostland.16  As memory writes a state’s 
biographical narrative and trauma provides an opening, a space for contestation, and a 
potential rewriting (or a need for rewriting) of the state’s identity narrative, memory also 
functions to write the collective identity of the diaspora.  Diaspora identity is connected to the 
home state but is also separate from the home state and based on different experiences.  Thus, 
in cases where the trauma is formative of the diaspora, it follows that the identity of the 
diaspora depends on a particular narrative of the trauma in order to continue to exist as a 
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cohesive collective with ties to a home state (rather than being assimilated into a receiving 
state).  That memory is reproduced over time.  At times the host state is implicated in the 
trauma – for example, in the case of Vietnamese refugees in the United States or Afghani and 
Iraqi refugees in the United States and the UK.  Where the host state is implicated in causing 
the trauma, the memory narrative is more complicated; for example, the host state might be 
positioned as both the aggressor and the ‘saviour’.  
Attending to diasporas and transnational populations in itself disrupts the possibility 
of a simple linear narrative of state identity.  Turning to postcolonial states similarly disrupts 
such a linear narrative indicating a different experience of identity.  National identity through 
the reproduction of the linear narrative for the state becomes emblematic of modernisation 
and is a way of unifying cultural identity.17  A national identity that exists in a biographical 
narrative and constitutes the state amongst its peers is a requisite of a modern nation state.  In 
postcolonial states, subject to the requisite of a unified cultural identity and linear identity 
narrative, Frantz Fanon’s postcolonial subject can offer insight into the diverse practices of 
identity as they might both counteract and produce the practice of constituting the national 
identity.   The profile of the post/colonial subject is a hybrid of contradictions posited by 
visibility.  The black man in a white world experiences himself through the perceptions of 
others, is rendered a subject position before his or her humanity: “When people like me, they 
tell me it is in spite of my colour.  When they dislike me, they point out it is not because of 
my colour […] We have a Senegalese history teacher … he is quite bright… Our doctor is 
coloured.  He is very gentle”.18  If this visibility and subjectification is shifted to the 
post/colonial state, the subject position of the post/colonial state comes prior to that state’s 
historical narrative identity which is dissected into the pre-colonial – colonised – postcolonial 
parts and so cannot be a continuous narrative.  The coloniser is positioned as the ‘civilising 
force’ and the colonised state as chaotic, emotional, undeveloped and uncivilised.  This 
positioning is experienced in the post/colonial state as a series of contradictions in a hybrid 
identity: pride and shame, arrogance and resentment, self-esteem and self-disgust.19  As Borg 
and Figuroa depict, the post/colonial ‘state’ (state of being) is to exist in contradiction and 
internal asymmetry manifested in a reluctance and undecidability in whether to fully embrace 
or fully reject the West.20  Thus to situate this asymmetry in the language of ontological 
security and identity requires a shift away from the linear biographical narrative instead to 
look at the meaning ascribed to a symbol of identity that circulates and, as it represents and 
memorialises aspects of identity the movement and change can capture the undecidability, 
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hybridity and asymmetry of identity.  The capacity for fluidity then underwrites the 
ontological security of hybrid identities that are manifested in multiple guises.  A postcolonial 
transnational identity must maintain hybridity and multiplicity in order to make sense in the 
fragmented experiences of dispersed postcolonial diaspora and transnational lived experience. 
Narratives of identity are complicated by movement and borders.  Postcolonial 
identity narratives problematize the notion of a linear biographical identity and draw attention 
to the implicit reification of the state in some renderings of ontological security in 
international relations.  Identities can be hybrid and incorporate multiple subject positions 
and contradictions.  Facets of identity are collective and mutual but it is necessary to 
recognise identity as fluid and changeable rather than fixed onto a linear narrative.21  
Identities become dispersed over space, generations and cultural experiences.  An ontological 
security that moves away from linearity and fixed notions of collective identity can offer a 
deeper understanding of security in lived experience and the potential for a security that 
moves beyond the state and can be mutually but still diversely experienced. To explore the 
mutual and diverse experience of ontological security I turn to a symbol rather than a 
narrative of identity. A symbol circulates amongst populations and resist fixity as its meaning 
is made in encounters. In the following analysis, the circulating symbol of ontological 
insecurity allows insight into how ontological security and insecurity is produced and tied to 
identity amongst people with hybrid and fluid identities. 
 
The Line as a Symbol: Conflict, Sanctuary, Recreation 
 
The Green Line 
Officially, the Green Line is the UN Buffer Zone that separates territory in the north of the 
island of Cyprus and home to the de facto state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
from territory in the south of the island that forms the Republic of Cyprus.  The line was 
drawn initially in 1964 by British Major General Peter Young as a ceasefire zone during 
intercommunal violence.  The line was then established as an impassable border in 1974 
following the Turkish invasion / intervention in the island.  The line bisects the island into the 
Republic of Cyprus and the de facto state the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 
which is recognised only by Turkey and Azerbaijan.  The Green Line dividing North from 
South in Cyprus represents the bifurcation of the island, rupturing the possibility of a 
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territorially unified Cypriot identity. The line also represents a rupturing of contiguous ethnic 
identities, marking the creation of refugee populations and Cypriot diasporas. The line is a 
border, but also a process of bordering: the line represents the constitution of separate Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots but it also constitutes Cypriot identity in relation to Europe and liberal 
democracy, and in relation to refugee and migrant ‘others.’ The line, a circulating symbol of 
ontological insecurity, reveals multifaceted and hybrid identities under the umbrella of 
‘Cypriot identity.’  
Symbols of the line circulate quite literally in everyday life; for example, every letter 
posted in the Southern part of the island requires a refugee stamp, which shows a crouching 
barefoot figure hunched in front of barbed wire that represents the Green Line, bearing the 
year 1974.  The cost of the stamp is donated to the national refugee fund. Every letter or 
postcard mailed requires an act of memory.  The stamp depicting the line then circulates 
internationally on mail amongst families, and on postcards sent by tourists reminding the 
recipients of the political conflict and associated suffering in the popular holiday destination. 
The figure of the Cypriot refugee simultaneously recognizes and rejects the division. A 
refugee is a person outside of their country of origin yet the refugee fund assists people 
displaced on the island. The act of labelling people refugees acknowledges that the territory 
from which the displacement has happened is not part of the Republic of Cyprus. The Green 
Line is then produced as a hard border that divides territory and literally circulates in that 
guise, as barbed wire on the postage stamp. The line is crucial in the making of the refugee, 
yet the naming of the refugee also constitutes the division: displaced persons might be inside 
one sovereign territory; refugees are always outside of their country of origin. In this way, 
naming refugees in Cyprus includes displacement and rupture in national identity. The line on 
the stamp circulates as symbol of ontological insecurity associated with a cohesive Cypriot 
identity. The line ruptures the sovereign contiguity of the island and produces refugee 
identities. 
 
The Line: Cypriots Dispersed 
A circulating symbol of identity might fulfil the role of national monuments and memorials to 
maintain and reproduce an alternative collective identity.  For example, in the case of the 
Cypriot diaspora in London, Greek Cypriots who left Cyprus as a consequence of events in 
1974 merged into the already-established Cypriot diaspora.  Prior to 1974 the diaspora 
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population existed as a collective united by cultural practices such as attending Greek 
Orthodox churches and Greek language schools, partaking in business enterprises and 
coalescing around community centres in particular parts of the city.  After 1974 the diaspora 
became tied to the conflict through the testimony of those exiled and through relationships 
with people dispersed by the conflict.  Of course, witnesses to trauma – people who 
experience it second hand through observing, concern for relatives, and bereavement – still 
experience the trauma although in a different way.22  The opening in a collective biographical 
identity narrative that is provoked by trauma allows, even requires, the narrative to be 
rewritten to account for the changed way a collective sees itself.  Thus, in 1974 the identity of 
the Greek Cypriot diaspora was reformed and reproduced to incorporate the exiled and to 
understand the meaning of the division of the island as it relates to the diaspora population.  
For example, the two biggest Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK formed following the 
conflict despite the presence of a Cypriot diaspora for decades prior.  The National 
Federation for Cypriots in the UK was formed immediately after the 1974 division of the 
island with the dual objective of promoting the cause of a reunited Cyprus free from Turkish 
troops and ‘colonists’, and for coordinating the work of UK Cypriots in political, social, 
cultural and educational spheres.23  The logo of the National Federation of Cypriots in the UK 
depicts the Green Line comprising a picture of the map of Cyprus with the Northern part cast 
in shadow, bearing the imperative ‘do not forget.’  Indeed, the Greek language reads “I do not 
forget” and the English language orders “Do not forget”.  This perhaps indicates the Greek 
Cypriots displaced by the conflict compelling their English-speaking children and 
grandchildren not to forget. Lobby for Cyprus was formed in 1992 by Greek Cypriot refugee 
communities from northern towns Agios Ambrosios, Akanthou, Lapithos and Karavas.  The 
stated objectives of Lobby for Cyprus are to remove all Turkish troops from the island, to 
repatriate all the ‘colonists’, and to return all the refugees to their land in the north.  The 
changed geography of the homeland changes and challenges diasporic links to the homeland 
and remakes those links in pursuit of a united, undivided Cyprus.  The villages that Greek 
Cypriots had ties to in the North of the island could no longer be understood 
unproblematically as Greek villages.  Thus ties to the homeland had to be reconfigured and 
reproduced in pursuit of reclaiming those territories. The emblem of the line circulates among 
the diaspora community physically in the logo of the National Federation of Cypriots in the 
UK and ideationally in the geography of Lobby for Cyprus. It simultaneously makes 
insecurity in the memory of conflict and security in providing the diaspora community a 
unique sense of identity. 
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Over the course of four decades the memory, testimony and narrative of the Cyprus 
conflict have been reproduced through generations that assume the responsibility for 
preserving the memory and narrative of the division.  The intergenerational inheritance of the 
trauma is fundamental to identity because the lived identity of second and third generation 
migrants is ruptured in terms of the imaginary of what life should be if the division of the 
island had not occurred.  That is, they have not experienced the trauma in their lifetime 
having been born post 1974 but have inherited an already-ruptured identity.  As national 
identity is made, memorialized and remade in the remembrance of war and conflict with 
national monuments and commemorations, it follows that diasporic identity is remade; 
however, as a minority population in a different country the diaspora does not have the 
capacity to build monuments or commemorations.  Instead, testimony and narrative 
memorialisation takes on particular importance as the memory is communicated in discourse 
and practice and infused with the emotion generated by trauma. 
In the case of Cypriots in London, identity is complicated because of Britain’s role in the 
conflict.  Cypriots fought Britain in the 1950s in pursuit of independence from Britain and 
enosis with Greece.  The British troops on the island hired Turkish Cypriots as police and 
practiced a politics of aggravating ethnic differences as a means of attempting to suppress the 
Greek Cypriot movement.  After independence Britain was named as a protectorate state, yet 
did not act to prevent the Turkish invasion / intervention, thus giving it an ambivalent role in 
Greek Cypriot histories.  Yet, because the Greek Cypriot diaspora is present in London (and 
existed in London before Cyprus was independent of Britain) the attachment to Britain serves 
to absolve responsibility and place the blame for the conflict squarely on Turkey. The 
‘colonists’ Lobby for Cyprus refers to are mainland Turkish citizens who have settled on the 
island rather than the British former colonisers. In the Greek Cypriot narrative of the conflict, 
Turkish Cypriots often feature as victims of the violence, expansionist politics and pursuit of 
power enacted by Turkey who is unfailingly positioned as the culprit.24   
The trauma of 1974 and the division of the island is formative of contemporary Cypriot 
identity and is memorialized and circulates.  The London Cypriot diaspora is linked to and 
shares mutual understanding with Cypriot diaspora communities in various places, with 
notable communities in the UK, Greece, the USA, Canada, South Africa and Australia.  As 
Cypriot transnational identity contains diverse attachments and is experienced in different 
ways by different collectives, generations, families and people, turning to the symbol of the 
line can offer insight into the circulation of an identity that transcends bordered national 
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communities, and shifts and changes over time, across generations, across space, and across 
culture.  The line represents the division of Cyprus but takes on alternate meaning as a 
symbol that feeds into Cypriot identity.  
 
 
Culture and conflict: Our Wall 
The 1993 documentary Our Wall was made by Panicos Chrysanthou, a well-known Cypriot 
film maker who has made several films about the Cyprus problem, and Niyazi Kızılyürek, a 
Turkish Cypriot academic and activist.  This documentary was made two decades after the 
division of the island and comprises personal narratives and memoirs. It departs from 
conventional narratives of the conflict by positing the wall as something that is formative of 
Cypriot identity and a product of Cypriotness.  The claiming of the wall in the use of the 
possessive ‘our’ in the title indicates a departure from the narratives of the wall that look to 
British colonialism and American interventionism. The title of this documentary ‘Our Wall’ 
indicates ownership – it does not seek to posit Cypriots as passive victims but to understand 
the role of the wall in Cypriot identity and experience.   
Identity features prominently as a theme in this documentary.  Our Wall begins with 
the line as a place where the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities come together 
in the form of the two film makers – Panicos Chrysanthou and Niyazi Kızılyürek – coming 
together in Ledra Palace, the checkpoint in Nicosia where the line could be crossed only with 
special permission between 1974 and 2003.  The buffer zone and the division is 
simultaneously represented as a problem as Kızılyürek, who had recently been travelling in 
France and had been accused of being a terrorist, describes.  The Turkish Cypriot academic 
was carrying his Cypriot passport issued before 1974, his passport of the TRNC, and his 
Turkish passport, issued to TRNC Cypriots for travel purposes.  He remarks that by the time 
he had explained himself to the border officer the officer had listened to ‘the history of 
Cyprus.’  Chrysanthou elaborates on the absurdity that while when he travels he is from the 
Republic of Cyprus and Kızılyürek is from the TRNC, Chrysanthou is actually from the 
northern part of the island and Kızılyürek from the south, and they are both refugees.  
Kızılyürek observes that the misunderstanding is not the mistake of border authorities but is 
the mistake is the island itself.25  Thus, immediately this documentary centres on the island 
and the lives and experiences of Cypriots, departing from the realpolitik explanations for the 
conflict.  It looks to the humanity of the conflict rather than the politics.  The line is not a 
military scar but is part of the peculiarity of the island and is reconfigured as the zone of 
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communication, as the only space on the island where people from the North and from the 
South could communicate with each other.  Yet the line immediately manifests its more 
problematic guise at the same time: the line is the zone of communication only because it is 
also a barrier that has divided and displaced.  The slippery symbolism of the wall is 
communicated from the outset of the documentary.   
The stories in this documentary are primarily stories of closeness between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.  A Turkish Cypriot goat-herder named Hasan who remained 
in the South following the division explains his choices – he married a Christian woman 
although their marriage could not be official because of their different religions.  Hasan’s 
language uses Greek and Turkish phrasing interchangeably.  He comments that his children 
‘blame’ him because they cannot speak Turkish and they cannot marry.  His explanation of 
his decision to stay is that he thought the division would be short-lived and everything would 
go back to normal.  Hasan himself represents the mixture of Greek and Turkish in a single 
person.  He is a symbol of Cypriotness that is not qualified by another national description.  
His language does not differentiate between Greek and Turkish but words from both mingle 
in his speech.  He married a Greek woman and stayed in the southern part of the island.  He 
did not expect the political separation to last because for him ethnic separation was not 
central to his experience until the separation was spatial, forced and permanent, at which 
point it impacted his life. 
Our Wall documentary is careful not to make a statement about the politics of Cyprus 
other than to attribute the separation of the island to the ‘triumph of divide and rule’ of 
colonial politics. The discussion of taksim (partition) and enosis (unification with Greece) 
carry the caveat of how Cypriots supported these political ideas ‘without being fully aware,’ 
suggesting the awareness of what taksim and enosis meant was not possible in practice and 
involvement in the respective movements, but only came in the aftermath of events.  In this 
way, the line discloses Cypriotness.  Following the division, the Northern part of the island 
did not enjoy the taksim that the movement imagined but instead became an unrecognized 
territory.  The Southern part of the island did not unify with Greece but became a truncated 
independent republic.  The idea of Turkish Cypriot identity and Greek Cypriot identity 
remained an idea and a Cypriot identity was revealed as it was lost. 
Instead of narrating the history, the documentary uses footage of the press statement 
given following the coup and after the Turkish invasion – thus the reference to the Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus is made through footage of the televised statement given by the 
Turkish foreign minister in 1974.  The reference to the ‘change in government’ (the Greek 
 
14 
 
coup) is made by the new government for the viewer to process.  The effect then is to use 
historical footage as documentary evidence of the terms in which the coup and the 
invasion/intervention were presented to Cypriot people and internationally at the time of 
occurrence – not to re-make or re-tell the statements two decades later. 
The line featured towards the end of the documentary as a physical line – illustrated 
by a British soldier who shows where one can stand with a foot on either side of the line – an 
action of course forbidden to Cypriots in the 1990s when the documentary was made and 
revealing the power of the colonizer state to fully take ownership. Even after independence 
Cypriots are prohibited from reaching parts of the territory that are free to British and UN 
soldiers.  Thus the post/colonial identity of Cyprus endures post-independence.  The line as a 
symbol of both security and insecurity is most clearly visible in this guise.  The line was 
created and the population was divided to provide security from ethnic discord and ethnic 
conflict.  The line was drawn and enforced by British and Turkish colonial powers in order to 
provide security for Cypriots.  Yet, the line creates insecurity both in practice by producing 
displaced people and refugees and in terms of identity by contesting the respective identities 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when taksim and enosis remained elusive, but the possibility 
of a Cypriot identity is foreclosed.  The endurance of the wall over time then further makes 
an ontological (in)security.  While it remains a symbol of security preventing conflict, the 
line marks Cyprus as a state that cannot be trusted to manage security and requires external 
intervention. 
The documentary ends with a voiceover recounting a fable of a mouse that had her 
tail chopped off by a trap but tried to pass off the tail-stump as the latest fashion.  Of course, 
while the other mice pretend they believe her story, really ‘they knew her tail had been cut off 
by a trap’.  The significance of this juxtaposed with footage of the wall suggests that the wall 
amputates part of the island – the Turkish part for Greek Cypriots and the Greek part for 
Turkish Cypriots.  Not just spatially, but culturally and personally.  Perhaps each community 
professes that this is preferred – it is the fashion of national identities – yet in reality everyone 
is aware that something is missing, has been cut off in a violent act. 
The end of this documentary is enigmatic, with the fable adopting Cypriots into 
responsibility without allocating blame, calling for reflection on the amputation of the 
corresponding cultural half of the island and recognising that Cypriot identity is both Turkish 
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot. The green line in the documentary exists as a symbol of identity 
but the identity is not static and fixed to the particular national identities: the line both divides 
and brings together the communities.  It provides ontological (in)security.  It reveals a 
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Cypriot identity as it forecloses that identity, meaning that Cypriotness is remade to 
incorporate the wall as part of the identity, illustrating a complexity and a fluidity that cannot 
be captured by a linear narrative. 
 
The Line as Route to Sanctuary 
The Green Line was a place of restricted movement for Cypriots between 1974 and 2003 
when the TRNC opened the border to some degree, allowing travel between the Republic of 
Cyprus and the TRNC and allowing displaced families to visit (but not reclaim) homes they 
had lost three decades earlier. The Green Line Regulation published by the European 
Commission states that the Republic of Cyprus  
shall carry out checks on all persons crossing the line with the aim 
to combat illegal immigration of third country nationals and to 
detect and prevent any threat to public security and public policy” 
whereas Article 3 states that "effective surveillance shall be carried 
out by the Republic of Cyprus all along the [Green] Line, in such a 
way as to discourage people from circumventing checks at the 
crossing points.26 
 
The emphasis on combatting ‘illegal immigration’ draws attention to the line as a functional 
European border, although it is not given official status as a European border, given that such 
status would require recognising the TRNC as a state.  In the 2006 European Commission 
report, the commission notes that the number of asylum seekers in Cyprus increased by more 
the 600% from 2002-2005, although no data is given on the success of asylum applicants.  
The emphasis is placed on the further strengthening of surveillance of the border zone to 
prohibit unauthorized crossing.  Thus, the border shifts from a wall preventing Cypriots from 
movement within their territory to a border that is internal to the land yet external – it takes 
on the new function of preventing asylum seekers and other third country nationals from 
entering European territory.  The contested status of the TRNC land is clearly visible in this 
context – people are present on land that is unrecognized by Europe as anything other than an 
illegally occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus.  Yet their presence on that land is not 
accepted as presence on European territory, thus asylum seekers in the TRNC do not fall into 
European jurisdictions of responsibility unless they cross the Green Line.  The line is 
therefore a border without being a border. The land of the TRNC becomes obsolete – it is 
neither European territory nor foreign territory. Cypriot identity is cast as belonging to the 
Republic of Cyprus and is therefore European and the presence of the TRNC is silenced. 
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 The 2006 annual report had a single category headed ‘The Crossing of Persons’ in 
which it detailed the movement of Cypriots and of third country nationals.  Each subsequent 
report has a separate category for ‘illegal migration’ across the line.27 The 2007 annual report 
narrates falling numbers of asylum seekers, which is attributed to increased cooperation 
between Cypriot police and UN forces monitoring the line, and increased surveillance 
including intelligence gathering and the physical presence of helicopters monitoring 
movement.28  The increased militarization of the crossing point is evident: each year the 
number of asylum seekers and ‘illegal migrants’ is described as ‘worrying,’ and of ‘serious 
concern.’  Consequently, the 2006 report recommends increasing detention centres and 
purchasing more surveillance equipment.  The 2007 report introduces helicopter surveillance 
and sharing of intelligence.  By 2010 there are day and night land and air patrols in place as 
well as ultraviolet surveillance equipment and access to central databases including a ‘stop-
list’.29  The report also notes that while the border cannot be considered an external border 
and therefore eligible for funding under the External Border Fund, the CYPOL staff who 
police the border participate in all FRONTEX training programmes.  Thus, the border that 
was de-militarized and opened in 2003 is re-militarized and monitored – not for Cypriot 
crossings but for third country nationals.  The line operates as a border of Europe in terms of 
the legal immigration jurisdiction and international humanitarian responsibilities, yet is not a 
border of Europe. For the migrant without papers the border is a physical border that 
represents the edge of Europe, access to sanctuary, asylum, and human rights.  For the 
European Commission the border is not a border of Europe yet migrants should be surveyed 
and the land protected as though it were one. The access to sanctuary, asylum, and human 
rights is an attractive pull-factor for unauthorized migrants who travel through Turkey to the 
TRNC.  The line is a place of exception: Cyprus is in Europe, but the Green Line is not 
European. 
 In these reports that reproduce a contested status – in which the border is a border that 
is not a border – Cypriot identity as a European state is contested, thus an ontological 
insecurity is tied to Cypriot Europeanness.  Cyprus requires monitoring of its abnormality, its 
aberration.  The de facto border represents insecurity for Europe as a vulnerable and porous 
external border.  It represents access to security and human rights for people trying to cross 
the line.  The line marks Cyprus as exceptional in Europe and sets Cypriot identity apart from 
European identity as the monitoring of the line is not undertaken by European border forces 
but by the UN and Cypriot police.  For people attempting to cross the line, the status of the 
Republic of Cyprus is clearly that of an EU member state contrasting the TRNC, which is 
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unrecognized and does not afford asylum seekers the protections of Europe.  Yet the presence 
of the line simultaneously contradicts and contests the European identity of Cyprus.  Thus, 
identity is slippery and fluid, is not simply one thing or another.  The line again disrupts a 
linear narrative of identity and circulates instead as a complex symbol of ontological 
insecurity: a border of Europe that is not a European border.   
 
 
The line as a tourist destination 
Cyprus was already a popular tourist destination before the line was militarized and closed in 
1974.  Famagusta was a popular growing resort in the 1970s; in fact, from beyond the line 
one can see the shells of the high-rise hotels in the Varosha tourist resort that have stood 
empty since the Turkish air campaign on Famagusta in 1974. However, the Green Line, 
particularly in the capital city of Lefkosia / Lefkosa is a point of fascination for tourists.  One 
can walk along the wall in the shadow of the Greek and Turkish watch-towers and see 
buildings with bomb-holes, nationalist propaganda and streets cut off with barricades that 
amount to little more than rubble much of the time.  The wall represents a monument for the 
Greek Cypriot diaspora: as my parents took me to visit the line and learn about the conflict as 
a child, Greek Cypriot diaspora families visit the line as a place to remember and to look 
towards homes and property in the North that they cannot access.  As Cyprus grew as a 
tourist destination, viewing the wall became part of the tourist path, with bus tours from all 
the major resorts taking tourists on a tour of some of the wall, the monument to independence 
and the scene of the Greek coup at the Archbishopric Palace, before depositing them for 
lunch and a spot of shopping in city centre. The way tourists encounter the Green Line 
produces Cyprus and Cypriot identity relationally, in the eyes of visitors. 
 The Rough Guide website advocates visiting the wall and crossing the border in 
Lefkosia, enabling the tourist ‘to sample two cultures in a single day,’  although warns that 
the ‘division is still “in your face”, particularly in the derelict areas of the Buffer Zone.’30 The 
same website describes the Shakolas Tower Observatory, a viewing platform and small 
museum of the conflict on the eleventh floor of a high rise building that was built in 1996 in 
the centre of the old town.  In 1996 the viewing platform was the only place where one could 
look over the wall into the streets of the TRNC capital, and into the green line buffer zone.  
The windows of the viewing platform feature maps that label buildings and geographical 
landmarks the viewer can then recognise in the view.  However, according to the Rough 
Guide website, the observatory has been ‘rendered redundant’ now that the Ledra Street 
 
18 
 
crossing is available.31  Rather than needing a platform from which one can resist the division 
and view the north, now the tourist can go to the TRNC and satisfy his or her curiosity.  This 
understands the observatory museum only within its political function.  It is still described by 
the Rough Guide as ‘the best place from which to view the gigantic and inflammatory TRNC 
flag painted on the hillside to the North of the City’.32  This flag is difficult to avoid from any 
of the streets in the southern part of Lefkosia serving as a constant visible reminder of the 
division, yet here it is packaged as a tourist attraction. 
 Tripadvisor includes an article on ‘Walking the Green Line.’33  This user-generated 
content has been approved by the website and describes the line as ‘the line that Turks and 
Greek Cypriots fought down to during the war’ with no mention of the UN ceasefire or the 
British plan of the line drawn in 1964, emphasizing the military role of the line.34  The line in 
this article becomes a tourist route on which: ‘you can see buildings that were bombed or shot 
up during the conflict. You pass several Greek Cypriot army posts, still manned by polite 
young men mostly talking on cell phones. You pass recently abandoned UN buildings and 
outposts. It's fascinating’.35  The tourist can add first-hand experience of a conflict zone to his 
or her holiday memories. 
 Virtual Tourist lists the Green Line as the first of the ‘Things to Do’ in Lefkosia.36  
This website consists of user-generated content so travellers can learn from people who have 
travelled.  Walking along the wall is described as highly recommended and one of the things 
you must do when visiting Lefkosia.  In the multiple user-generated reviews of the experience 
of the wall, many of the comments place the word ‘border’ in inverted commas, 
acknowledging the realness and absurdity of this border that is not a border.  Additionally, 
several reviews make reference to the ‘last divided city’ in Europe or in the world, 
compelling others to go and see this anomaly – presumably before things change.37  The 
Cyprus conflict and the dividing line is portrayed as a dying species in a globalising world, 
not with negative connotations but with reference to the exotic – a tourist can experience an 
authentic illiberal space, without leaving the comfort of a European holiday resort.  In the 
tourist context the Green Line is positioned as a living museum, a relic of a bygone age that 
can be consumed along with the Roman, Venetian and Byzantine antiquities on the island.  
The Ottoman history of the island that is written out of Greek Cypriot tourist sites can then be 
seen by simply traversing a line no wider than four city blocks.  The line is the marker of a 
political division that happened ‘in our lifetime’ – an exotic Berlin Wall that continues to be 
an authentic experience for the discerning and sensitive tourist.  Once again the line reflects a 
hybrid identity, allowing for the safest type of conflict tourism.  The creation of the line as a 
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tourist attraction symbolises Cyprus as a tourist resort welcoming millions of European 
tourists each year.  Yet, Cyprus is made exotic by the wall: the tourist remains in Europe but 
leaves Europeanness and Cypriot identity is produced on the margins of Europe, post/colonial 
and different.  
 
The circulating symbol of the wall: Ontological security and post/colonial identity 
 This paper contained two objectives: to contest and problematize the emphasis on 
linearity in narrative identities, drawing on and interrogating ontological security in 
international relations, and to offer a reading of the Green Line in Cyprus as an illustration of 
a circulating symbol of ontological insecurity that makes and remakes identity, in its 
performance,  narration, visibility and its relational capacity.   
The theory of ontological security has offered insight into how memory constitutes 
state identity and offers explanatory potential for state actions, engaging affect and moving 
beyond conventional security and foreign policy understandings.  Yet, narratives of identity 
are complicated by movement and postcolonial identity narratives problematize the notion of 
a linear biographical identity and draw attention to the implicit reification of the state in some 
renderings of ontological security in international relations.  Ontological security that 
understands security as a process offers a deeper understanding of security in lived 
experience and the potential for a security that moves beyond the state and can be mutually 
but still diversely experienced. To explore the mutual but diverse experience of ontological 
security I turned to a symbol rather than a narrative of identity. 
 I discussed the Green Line in multiple guises. I looked at its significance for Cypriot 
identity in the diaspora community. I looked at how it circulates on a postage stamp and I 
examined an artistic rendering, narrating the history of the line in a documentary. I 
considered the line as it is produced in European official documents and I looked at how the 
line is produced as a tourist destination. That the line appears in so many different roles 
illustrates how it circulates as a symbol with shifting and changing meaning but tied to 
various aspects, understandings and performances of Cypriot identity. As the line shifts and 
changes, identity shifts and changes.  The understanding of the line as it appears in each case 
relies on its fluidity and hybridity to articulate meaning.  The symbol is not bound by the 
confines of a linear narrative of identity that fixes meaning.  The symbol of the line produces 
meaning in its articulation.  As it circulates amongst different communities and in different 
spaces the meaning changes and reflects the hybridity of the post/colonial Cypriot identity.  
The Green Line in Cyprus symbolizes the division of the island but can be read in multiple 
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forms – the conventional guise as a symbol of conflict retains importance but is remade 
through tourism where the sight of UN troops allows for authentic experience of a conflict 
zone.  The line also represents a rupture in Cypriot identity, an amputation of the culture that 
completes the Cypriot whole and offers insight into the dispersed and problematic Cypriot 
identity and endurance of the separation.  The line represents security and insecurity.  
Simultaneously the line represents a border as a place of sanctuary for asylum seekers, a zone 
of vulnerability for EU border enforcement, and a space of contestation that is a border that is 
not a border. The different articulations of this circulating symbol of ontological insecurity 
that is produced, reproduced, seen and consumed by different people in different places 
allows for an identity that shifts and changes, that is hybrid and can be European, liberal and 
simultaneously Other.  Ontological security, as it relies on identity, then resides in the 
hybridity and fluidity of identity in this case and the Green Line is a symbol of how that 
identity is made and performed. To consider the symbol allows for an understanding of 
ontological security that can be compatible with postcolonial, transnational, diasporic, and 
migrant identities. 
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